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Abstract—Game theory has been developed by scientists as a
theory of strategic interaction among players who are supposed
to be perfectly rational. These strategic interactions might have
been presented in an auction, a business negotiation, a chess
game, or even in a political conflict aroused between different
agents. In this study, the strategic (rational) agents created by
reinforcement learning algorithms are supposed to be bidder
agents in various types of auction mechanisms such as British
Auction, Sealed Bid Auction, and Vickrey Auction designs. Next,
the equilibrium points determined by the agents are compared
with the outcomes of the Nash equilibrium points for these
environments. The bidding strategy of the agents is analyzed
in terms of individual rationality, truthfulness (strategy-proof),
and computational efficiency. The results show that using a multi-
agent reinforcement learning strategy improves the outcomes of
the auction simulations.
Index Terms—Reinforcement Learning, Multi-Agent Rein-
forcement Learning; Auction Simulation; Nash Equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
A multi-user game is a setting in which one player’s payoff
depends not only on that player’s action but also on what
the other player is doing. In many games, players do not
have a dominant strategy among a multitude of options. A
well-balanced game provides meaningful options to its players
while avoiding dominant strategies. On the other hand, in real
life, players might have dominant strategies —strategies that
represent the best response to all possible strategies. The best
response, on the other hand, is the best strategy given based on
what you think or believe the other competitor might do. Nash
equilibrium is a kind of stability, described as a combination
of strategies in a game so that rational players do not have an
incentive to deviate from their choice [1]. A rational player in
this context is more related to the selection of actions from
a set of alternatives. If an agent is capable of ranking the
outcomes of each possible action and able to calculate the
possible outcomes for a given sequential set of actions, or
able to choose the most preferred outcome with a given action
of the other player, he or she is called a “rational” player.
In addition to rationality, in the auction design, we assume
that the actors are strategy-proof, which means that they play
the game truthfully. Therefore, if there is a dominant strategy
among a set of alternative actions, the player chooses that
action or the best strategy truthfully.
In this paper, we create a Reinforcement Learning (RL) en-
vironment with a game design where the agents are competing
to get a product in an auction and get positive or negative
rewards based on the outcome of their actions. Each agent
has a “private” value for the product. It is “private” since the
counterpart has no idea about the agent’s appraisal for the
product. The action set for the agents consists of “bid” and
“stop.” When an auction ends, the reward for the winner is
the difference between the winning price of the auction and
the private value of the agent while the loser gets a negative
reward, which represents the auction fee.
II. RELATED RESEARCH
Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) is an important
and interdisciplinary research area that has been applied to
several domains such as computer science, bioinformatics, and
operations research [2] [3]. Nanduri and Das [4] propose a
stochastic approximation-based reinforcement learning algo-
rithm to converge the Nash Equilibrium of n-player matrix
games. The results of their algorithm on 16 different matrix
games are compared to a software program, GAMBIT [5].
Also, the authors propose a practical application on the electric
power market to get strategic bidding. It is important to offer
an actual use case for the RL agents. Similarly, Oroojlooyjadid
et al. [6] propose multi-agent learning solutions to real-life
examples. The authors propose a machine learning algorithm
based on deep Q-networks to optimize the replenishment
decisions at a given stage for inventory optimization of a beer
game.
The proposed examples are not restricted to games [7] [8]
[9] [10] [11] [12]. Nowe et al. [13], for example, focus on
the application side of the reinforcement learning techniques
in multi-agent reinforcement learning with the game theory
perspective based on economic research. The authors point
out that in the multi-agent setting, the agents should not have
opposing goals to get a clear and optimal solution. Also, it
is important to address all the issues regarding the dynamic
environment. Since there is incomplete information about the
environment, each agent observes the changing state rather
than the other agent’s action, which is the reason for the
reward of the agent. In that research, similar to those proposed
beforehand, the RL agents have similar goals. In addition
to the goals of the RL agents, efficiency in computation is
an important detail. Focusing on practical learning of human
behavior in zero-sum settings, Ling et al. [14] aim to prevent
the limitations in the space of player strategies and create ef-
ficient and measurable computations. Therefore, they generate
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2a more general model called “Nested Logit Quantal Response
Equilibrium” in which the ideas in behavioral science are used,
and the changes in the degree of player rationality in different
stages of the game are allowed.
Searching for a stationary Nash equilibrium in a finite
discounted general-sum stochastic game, Prasad et al. [15]
consider a Markov game, a finite stochastic game evolving
over discrete time instants. They construct their model with
the target of maximization of the expected discounted value
of the agents’ rewards in a dependent transition dynamics and
agent actions. The use of necessary and sufficient Stochastic
Game-Sub-Problem (SG-SP) conditions lead them to develop
converging two actor-critic algorithms for model-based and
model-free, named as OFF-SGSP and ON-SGSP, respectively.
ON-SGSP algorithm is evaluated to perform better than
MARL algorithms, and its convergence is observed to be
quicker. Lin et al. [16] focus on stochastic games, which are
generalized forms of Markov decision processes to a game-
theoretic scenario, and they use multi-agent inverse reinforce-
ment learning (MIRL) constructed in this framework. The
results of a competitive two agent zero-sum MIRL problem
and its comparison with Bayesian MIRL in the setting of
an abstract soccer game show that the covariance structure
is relatively more important when the mean value in reward
priors is considered.
Cai et al. [17] search an optimal model for the allocation
of buyer impression to the potential sellers taking place in
e-commerce websites. They use reinforcement mechanism
design, and this general framework focuses on the strategic
behaviors of the sellers and the history of impressions, prices,
transactions, collected revenue, and the actions are evaluated
under a Markov decision process. The design of the actor-
critic policy gradient algorithm is generated under the setting
of a Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient (DDPG) algorithm
and an Impression Allocation (IA) algorithm performing the
best outcome, is created.
III. METHODOLOGY
In this game design, the agents are competing to get a
product P in an auction. Each agent has a private appraisal
for the selling product. The action set for the agents consists
of “bid a new price” (the price is an available option in
the auction which may be increasing or decreasing for the
different auction types) and “stop bidding.” When an auction
ends, the reward for the winner is the difference between the
winner price and the appraisal of the agent; the loser gets
zero outcomes (or negative reward represents the auction fee).
The figure below illustrates a simplistic case for an auction in
reinforcement learning. As can be seen in Figure 1, the agents
have the action space of “Bid” and “Stop.” Bidding means
the initial action to step in the auction, as well as increasing
the current price of the product. “Stop” action, on the other
hand, has the meaning of resting the auction. Each agent has a
private appraisal for the auctioned product. Depending on the
auction type, the next state is determined by the bidding (i.e.,
actions were taken) behavior of the agents. The final reward
is the difference between the private appraisal for the product
Fig. 1: A reinforcement learning mechanism for an auction
design.
and the close price of the auction. The reward will be positive
when the price is set below the appraisal level; otherwise,
it will be 0 or negative. In the case scenario that this study
suggests, there is no entrance or bidding fee. Therefore, if an
agent draws the auction in any stage, the reward will be zero.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
The reinforcement learning agents are trained in an open
bid with one period model initially. In this model, each agent
has just one chance to bid, and the order of the bidding is
sequential: the second agent sees the first agent’s price and
decides either bidding or not and so on.
Figure 2 and Figure 3 show the hyperparameters, the
heatmap, and the rewards for the agents in a bidding envi-
ronment with a ceiling price of $5, agent’s private valuations
of $3.5 with a non-divisible product and an entrance fee for $1
(which means the losing party has a negative payoff). In this
scenario, the bid increment is $1, and the agents have to bid
scaler bids. As can be seen in the figure, after 1000 epochs,
the first agent’s action is saturated (a dominant strategy) to bid
“$4”, which results in a $0.5 positive reward for the agent. On
the other hand, the second agent has no dominant strategy but
has a mixed strategy to bid either draw (0) or lower bid, which
results in a “0” payoff for the second agent. As for the second
agent, increasing the bid result in a higher current price (i.e.,
$5), which results in a negative outcome (-$1.5) for the second
agent since the appraisal for the product is set as $3.5. This
is the equilibrium for the game, first agent bids “4” and gets
“0.5” payoff, and the second agent draws the auction with a
“-1” payoff.
As can be seen in Figure 2 and Figure 3, the second agent
has some positive rewards in the initial stages (and around
1000 epochs as well) as a result of the “exploration” of the
first agent to the environment. As the exploration parameters
decay in the last 1000 epochs, the rewards for the agents
become $0.5 and -$1, respectively. In Figure 4 and Figure
5, the environment has been slightly extended to a higher
ceiling price ($20) while everything else remains constant.
As can be seen from the graphs, the second agent has some
positive rewards in the initial stages (and around 1000 epochs
as well) as a result of the “exploration” of the first agent to the
environment. As the exploration parameters decay in the last
3(a) Reward function for the first player.
(b) Reward function for the second player.
Fig. 2: One Period Open Bid with a ceiling price of 5 for an
indivisible good.
1000 epochs, the rewards for the agents become $0.5 and -$1,
respectively. In Figure 4 and Figure 5, the environment has
been slightly extended to a higher ceiling price ($20) while
everything else remains constant. As can be seen from the
graphs, the first agent always bids a slightly higher price (i.e.,
$8) than his/her valuation, which covers the entry fee. On the
other side, the second agent bids up to their valuation as well.
The equilibrium points are said to be a Nash Equilibrium for
this game as well.
This time, the type of auction is changed to the Close
Auction. In this type of environment, RL agents do not see
the opponent’s bids while deciding an action (bid) to take. The
ceiling price is $5, and there is also the entrance fee of $1 paid
by the losing player. The final decisions are built by the type
of good, whether it is divisible or indivisible. Figure 6 shows
the sealed (close) auction with an agent valuation of 3.5 of a
divisible good.
As for the close bid for an indivisible good, both agents act
Fig. 3: Heat map representation of the last 100 games for two
players.
as rational players in the game. The outcomes for both agents
are negative (Figure 7). Since the good is indivisible, both
the agents bid the amount of $4, and the winner is selected
randomly. It is also worth to note that they are still in pure
Nash Equilibrium point for the game.
Let us suppose that the product is a divisible product and
the agents can cooperate and collaborate for the product. The
outcomes are summarized below (Figure 8).
The heat map for Figure 8 shows that 50% of the games
end in (2,2) and 20% of the games end in (3,3) which yield
positive outcomes for the RL agents and 30% of the games
end in (4,4) which gives negative outcomes to the RL agents.
The points are still among the pure Nash solutions for the
game. Figure 9 shows the Nash solutions for the same setup
revealed in different types of agents (types: Friend and Foe).
As for multi-period bidding, the RL agents are supposed
to play with a chance to bid more than one bidding. This is
the environment in which each of the agents has more turns
as long as the auction continues. For this reason, the setup
for the game was changed so that each player can have one
more chance to bid (two periods). Here is the new setup for
the RL agents: Two periods, divisible good, and the base price
is $3.5 for both of the agents. As can be seen in Figure 10,
the first agent sticks to the bid $4 at the very beginning, and
the second agent draws the game. Although this bid returns a
negative outcome to the first bidder, choosing a different bid
yields more negative outcomes.
The last part of the auction design is about Vickrey Auction.
In Vickrey Auction, the winner is the bidder who pays the
highest, and the winner price may differ: it may be the second-
best, or third, even the minimum bid. In this section, it is
supposed that the winner is the agent who has the highest
bid, and the winner price is the minimum bid, which is the
loser agent’s bid. In this game setup, the valuation is $3.5 for
both agents, the loser pays $1, and if there is a case of the
same bid, both agents pay $1.5 for re-setup. As can be seen in
4(a) Reward function for the first player.
(b) Reward function for the second player.
Fig. 4: One Period Open Bid with a ceiling price of 20 for an
indivisible good.
Figure 11, the first agent decides to bid always the highest bid
($5), which means that the agent has a dominant strategy, but
the second agent does not bid the highest bid which results
in a negative outcome (-$1.5). Thus, any bid lower than $5
results in a case that the first agent gets the product with the
second agent’s bidding price. It is worth to note that there is
no dominant strategy for the second agent.
This time, the good is changed to divisible ones. If both
agents agree on a price, they will get half of the product,
and pay half of the price they bid. This time, both agents bid
$4, and get a negative outcome (-$0.25). It is worth to note
that there is a chance for both agents to bid lower than their
true valuation and get a positive outcome, but on the contrary,
their bids are slightly higher than their true prices ($3.5). The
MARL agents show that the Vickrey auction reveals the true
valuation of the agents.
If the true values of the agents are changed to 3, it is
expected that both agents will give their true valuation as
their bids (entrance fee is $1). Figure 12 and Figure 13 below
illustrate the Vickrey Auction for both divisible and non-
Fig. 5: Heat map representation of the last 100 games for two
players.
divisible goods. It can be seen that the RL agents bid their
true valuation for the product. The agents act as individually
rational and in a truthful manner. The result which they decide
is still a Nash equilibrium for the game.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, it is questioned whether the agents created
by RL algorithms are the rational agents in different types of
auction mechanisms or not. The equilibrium points in different
types of bidding environments determined by these agents
show that they act as rational agents. The bidding strategy of
these agents in each type of auction mechanism revealed the
fact that the RL agents are individually rational and strategy-
proof. The strategic agents created by the RL algorithms are
supposed to be the bidder agents in different types of auction
mechanisms such as British, Sealed Bid Auction, and Vickrey
Auctions mechanisms.
The first experiment is about the decision mechanism of RL
agents in British auction design. In this scenario, one period-
British auction model for a divisible good, each agent having
just one chance to bid and the order of bidding is sequential:
the second agent sees the first agent’s price (open bid) and
decides on bidding or not. The results show that RL agents
play individually rational in this type of environment, so the
outcome of the British auction yields a Nash equilibrium.
The second experiment is about sealed bid auction (close
bid). In this type of auction, RL agents cannot see the other’s
bid while deciding on an action. The joint action of the RL
agents determines the winner of the game. In this game setup,
both agents act as rational players as well. Thus, the outcomes
for both agents yield negative results. It is also worth noting
that RL agents are still in pure Nash Equilibrium of the game.
As for an indivisible good, both agents act as rational,
too. Both RL agents bid the same price (i.e., $4), so the
outcomes for both agents become negative. Since the good
is indivisible and both the agents bid the same amount, the
5(a) Reward function for the first player.
(b) Reward function for the second player.
(c) Heat map function.
Fig. 6: One Period Close Bid with a ceiling price of 5 for a
divisible good.
(a) Reward function for the first player.
(b) Reward function for the second player.
(c) Heat map function.
Fig. 7: One Period Close Bid with a ceiling price of 5 for an
indivisible good.
6Fig. 8: Heat map functions for players, One period Open Bid
for a divisible good.
winner is selected by picking one of them randomly. It is also
worth noting that the state where the game ends is still the
pure Nash Equilibrium point of the game.
As far as a divisible good in an open bid, we assume that
the agents can collaborate for the product. In this type of game
design, the states where the game ends that are constituted as
different points in the game. That is to say, 50% of the games
end in ($2, $2) and 20% of the games ends in ($3, $3) which
yield positive outcomes for the RL agents and 30% of the
games end in ($4, $4) which gives negative outcomes to the
agents. The points are still among the pure Nash solutions for
the game. Similarly, when the learning algorithm is changed
from Q-Learning to Foe and Friend, the ending states are
also changed. In Foe, the ending state is ($4, $4), which
brings negative outcomes for the agents, whereas in Friend,
the ending state is ($1, $1), which yields the highest possible
positive outcome for the game. Thus, we find that as the
learning algorithm changes, the ending states for the games
also do change.
From a single-stage game, we turned to multiple stages for
the games where the RL agents are supposed to play with a
chance to bid more than one bidding. In this type of auction
environment, both agents have more turns unless the game
ends. The results show that the game ends at the beginning
stage, where it is a Nash equilibrium of the game, even though
the outcome is negative for the agents.
Lastly, we conduct a Vickrey Auction design for the in-
divisible product. Although the game has many pure Nash
Equilibrium states, the game ends with the states where one
of the RL agents has a dominant strategy of $5, and the other
agent has no dominant strategy, changing from “not enter”
to $4. Since the product is indivisible and the loser gets a
negative outcome, and any bid lower than $5 results in a
weakly less negative outcome for the first agent. Thus, the
agent who has a dominant strategy ($5), gets the product with
the second agent’s bidding price. It is worth saying that if
(a) Type of agents: Friend.
(b) Type of agents: Foe.
Fig. 9: Heat map, Pure Nash Equilibria in Different Types of
Learners.
one of the agents insists on the same strategy over the others,
the second agent adjusts the situation and differs its strategy.
In other words, in the case of paying $1.5 for readjusting the
auction environment, the agent decides to lose $1 with bidding
different than $5. In this Vickrey auction, the game ends with
the highest possible winning bid, $5, but the winner has to pay
the bid of the second agent, which is less than $5. Therefore,
the agent who has a dominant strategy gets both positive and
negative outcomes depending on the second agent’s biddings.
Even though reaching the pure Nash equilibrium points is not
seen possible by iteration of the strategies of the agents, the
RL agents learn to act as a rational and strategy-proof player
and reach the Nash equilibrium. As for Vickrey auction for
7(a) Bids per period for the first player.
(b) Reward function of the first player.
(c) Reward function of the second player.
Fig. 10: Reward functions for players and the multi-period
bidding for a non-divisible good.
(a) Heat map for the game, valuation 3.5.
(b) Reward function of the first player.
(c) Reward function of the second player.
Fig. 11: Reward functions of the players during Vickrey
Auction with non-divisible goods.
8(a) Reward function of the first player.
(b) Reward function of the second player.
Fig. 12: Reward functions for players, Vickrey Auction with
non-divisible goods.
divisible goods, both agents have the same strategy to bid
($4) and get a negative outcome (-$0.25). It is worth noting
that both agents choose to bid consistent with the appraisal
for the product (i.e., $3.5), which is the main finding of this
game setup. Even though there is room for both agents to bid
lower than their true valuation and get a positive outcome,
both of the RL agents bid with their true prices, which means
the Vickrey auction reveals the true valuation of the agents.
In this paper, multi-agent reinforcement learning agents in
different auction setups were created. At the initial state of
the game, both agents have no experience with the type and
the mechanism of the auction. With a reward function and
the state information, both RL agents become rational and
strategy-proof bidding agents. It is also worth noting that the
final state of the RL agent in the Vickrey auction for divisible
goods reveals the fact that Vickrey Auction also gives similar
solutions to the bidders compared to the other type of the
auction mechanism. For this reason, the RL agents we create
(a) Heat map for valuation of 3.5.
(b) Heat map for valuation of 3.0.
Fig. 13: Heat map values, Vickrey Auction with non-divisible
goods.
9in this study can also be used to analyze how a rational and
strategy-proof agent acts in a newly created auction environ-
ment. Also, in the Vickrey auction for indivisible goods, we
did not expect to see a dominant strategy for an agent since
both agents have the same hyperparameters for the game. The
reason why they are not identical agents is that they differ in
the “exploration” phase of the game setup. In other words,
since both agents explore the environment on a random scale,
they learn different information within the same state since
their actions may differ. Even though we use the same learning
rate and epsilon value for the RL agents, they become different
agents. For this reason, we do not use different parameters for
the agents, which can be done in further research. On the
other hand, in real life, some agents are risk-averse, and some
of them are greedy. Therefore, mimicking this type of human
interaction in the auction environment by RL agents would be
interesting and resourceful.
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